Instruction boundaries in retrieved content
We test whether directives embedded in retrieved pages, documents, or tool responses can alter the user's task, shape subsequent responses, or trigger an unintended tool call.
A retrieved page can redirect an agent. A tool can act on model output. A downloaded model file can contain unsafe behavior. We investigate these paths with targeted tests and document what we observe.
Whether source material changes the authorized task.
Where authorization and approval checks apply.
Where information can leave the workflow.
Whether loading introduces executable behavior.
Our work focuses on the boundaries between untrusted inputs, system permissions, and sensitive data.
We test whether directives embedded in retrieved pages, documents, or tool responses can alter the user's task, shape subsequent responses, or trigger an unintended tool call.
We trace how an external instruction reaches a tool, then examine the permissions, approval steps, and user intent checks along that path.
We follow sensitive context through retrieval, prompts, tool arguments, external requests, and logs to identify where it could be disclosed.
For teams running downloaded models, we examine file formats and loading paths for code a file would run and for behavior that starts before the model answers its first request.
A finding should show its setup, input, observable effects, and limits.
The authorized task, model, tools, permissions, and relevant system settings.
The payload, its source, and the point where it crossed into the workflow.
The response, tool activity, and any data movement visible during the test.
The conditions under which the behavior appeared and the limits of what was observed.
A result applies to the configuration tested. Changes to the model, tools, or permissions can change the outcome.